

Business Email Compromise (BEC)

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Introduction (Hi!)



- Over 12 years of experience in IT and Security
- Multiple industry certifications: CISSP, CEH/CNDA, MCITP, CCAA
- Doctorate of Science, Cybersecurity
- Dissertation: An Examination of Vulnerability Scoring Using Chained Vulnerability Attacks
- Focus: vulnerability and risk management, incident response, threat intelligence and hunting
- **All information is open-source


Agenda

- Phishing / Spear-phishing / BEC
- What is BEC?
- Types of BEC
- Attack Vectors
- How to Detect
- How to Prevent
- BEC Research




Phishing

- Can be done with email or text messages
- Noticed suspicious activity / log-in attempts
- Problem with payment / account
- Might have **fake invoice**
- Click link to make payment
- Eligible for government refund / **IRS scams**
- Coupon for free items



Avoid Phishing




- Use **Multi-factor Authentication!!!**
- Protect mobile devices – updates / security software / encryption
- If suspicious – call Information Security team or Helpdesk
- **Verify site's security** – many tools available
- Consider **white-listing**, instead of blocking certain sites
- Keep systems patched

Spear-Phishing



- Phishing – broader term for **ANY** attempt
- Spear-Phishing – more thought / targeted
- Starts with potentially viewing social media profile to acquire target
- Use email address, friends, location, any related posts
- Messages include **URGENT** requests
- Take victims to spoofed website – ask for passwords, pins, account numbers, etc

Avoid Spear-Phishing



- Do **NOT** post personal information on social media sites
- Use different passwords on every account - try a password manager
- Always update software!!!
- Do **NOT** click on any links in an email – go directly to account in browser
- Be wary of friend requests or emails from “friends”
- Implement Data Protection Program = user education + best practices + **Data Loss Prevention (DLP) software**

What is BEC?

- Targets companies who conduct wire transfers / suppliers abroad
- Spoofing of corporate / publicly available emails of executives
- Compromise through keyloggers or initial phishing attack
- Fraudulent transfers from attackers
- Carefully research / monitor potential victims / organizations




BEC Statistics! (From FBI IC₃)

- Most costly cybercrime – comes from BEC scams
- 2013-2014 – 1,198 companies affected
- Between 2013-2018 – thieves took \$12 billion
- 63% fraud losses are related to BEC
- Reported in all 50 states / 79 countries



Private Industry

- May 2014
- Scam impersonated chief executive
- Policy is for computer and funds transfer fraud
- Covered up to \$3 million
- Initial ask was for \$480,000, then requested \$18 million
- Transfer to Agricultural Bank of China
- Suing cyber insurance – refusing to cover \$480,000 loss in BEC



Non-Profit Organization

- Occurred in 2017
- \$1 million cyber scam
- Connecticut-based nonprofit
- Compromised employee email, posed as employee, created false invoices
- Sent money to fraudulent person in Japan (we need solar panels!)
- Recouped most of losses with cyber insurance



Fire Department

- 2 employees involved
- Gave \$52,000 away in cyberattack
- Sent money to Turkish bank account
- Targeted Chief Executive / National Commander
- Employees did not follow spending / ordering rules



Types of BEC

- Bogus Invoice Scheme – foreign suppliers requesting payments
- CEO Fraud – **Pose as CEO** / executive requesting transfer
- Account Compromise – Executive account hacked
- Attorney Impersonation – Pretend to be from law firm (**CRUCIAL** or **CONFIDENTIAL** matters)
- Data Theft – HR / Payroll employees targeted – want **PII** or tax statements

Email Spoofing



- Email header **forgery**
- Message appears to originate from someone / somewhere else
- Popular in phishing / spam campaigns
- Hackers need an SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) server and Outlook or Gmail
- Detection: Find originating IP address and trace back to sender
- Detection: Sender Policy Framework (SPF) – if soft-failed, something might be **FISHY!**

Email Spoofing Example




```
mail from: dude1@domain1.com
rcpt to: dude2@domain2.com
data

From: Dude1 <dude1@domain1.com>
Subject: Nice To Meet You!
Date: February 13, 2018 3:30:58 PM PDT
To: dude1 <dude1@domain1.com>
Reply-To: dude2 <dude2@domain2.com>

Hi Dude1,
It's nice to meet you!
```

Envelope

Header / Body



Reference ^:

<https://www.proofpoint.com/us/corporate-blog/post/how-does-email-spoofing-work-and-why-it-so-easy>

Reference >: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection>

Email Header Forgery

Reference: <https://www.howtogeek.com/121532/htg-explains-how-scammers-forge-email-addresses-and-how-you-can-tell/>

Delivered-To: [MY EMAIL ADDRESS]

Received: by 10.182.3.66 with SMTP id a2csp104490oba;

Sat, 11 Aug 2012 15:32:15 -0700 (PDT)

Received: by 10.14.212.72 with SMTP id x48mr8232338eeo.40.1344724334578;

Sat, 11 Aug 2012 15:32:14 -0700 (PDT)

Return-Path: <e.vwidxus@yahoo.com>

Received: from 72-255-12-30.client.stsn.net (72-255-12-30.client.stsn.net. [72.255.12.30])

by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c41si1698069eem.38.2012.08.11.15.32.13;

Sat, 11 Aug 2012 15:32:14 -0700 (PDT)

Received-SPF: neutral (google.com: 72.255.12.30 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of e.vwidxus@yahoo.com) client-ip=72.255.12.30;

Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=neutral (google.com: 72.255.12.30 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of e.vwidxus@yahoo.com) smtp.mail=e.vwidxus@yahoo.com

Received: by vwidxus.net id hnt67m0ce87b for <[MY EMAIL ADDRESS]>; Sun, 12 Aug 2012 10:01:06 -0500 (envelope-from <e.vwidxus@yahoo.com>)

Received: from vwidxus.net by web.vwidxus.net with local (Mailing Server 4.69)


id 34597139-886586-27/.PV3Xa/WiSKhnO+7kCTI+xNiKJsH/rC/

for root@vwidxus.net; Sun, 12 Aug 2012 10:01:06 -0500

...

From: "Canadian Pharmacy" e.vwidxus@yahoo.com

Invoice Scams (1 of 2)



Invoice Scams (2 of 2)



CEO / Executive Fraud




Attorney Impersonation

- Many methods to BEC, but **two most common scenarios** are CEO fraud and Attorney impersonation
- Attacker contacts employee directly
- Fake attorney is included in important case (**NO TIME!!!!**)
- **Transfer funds** to attorney or gain sensitive proprietary data
- Could be a great example for a **phishing exercise!**



Credential Stuffing

1. Attacker acquires usernames / pw from a website breach / pw dump site
2. Uses account checker to test stolen creds against website (ex: social media)
3. Successful logins allow attacker to take over account
4. Drains stolen accounts (PII, stored values, etc)
5. Use account info going forward (send spam / create transactions)



Reference: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Credential_stuffing

Reference (image): <http://michael-coates.blogspot.be/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html>

How to Detect?

- Email received from Executive team or leadership – must process payment **now!**
- Message is brief, **urgent**, bypass normal processes
- Sender may say they are traveling – from **mobile device** (as shown in our example!)
- Email is from Gmail / Hotmail instead of business account
- Someone asks you to open **bank account** to send / receive money
- And if you can't tell, call your **Helpdesk or Security** team!

BEC Research

- Trend Micro Report (2018) – Malware in BEC has decreased / attackers prefer more simple phishing attacks
- David Zweighaft (2017) – Determined financial institutions need to be proactive / create culture of skepticism / more training
- Asaf Cidon et al. (2019) – Worked on tool with Barracuda Networks to prevent BEC attacks using supervised learning

Reference: <https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/TrackingTrendsInBusinessEmailCompromise.pdf>

Reference: <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JOIC-02-2017-0001/full/html>

Reference: <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/cidon>

How to Prevent (1 of 2)

- **Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Rules** (xy-business vs xy_business)
- **Email rules** (reply is different from the “from” email)
- **Color coding** (internal accounts (ex: blue) / external (ex: purple))
- **Payment verification** (require two-factor authentication!!!)
- **Confirmation request** (maybe add phone verification? Directory vs external numbers)
- **Scrutiny** – tell your employees to report suspicious fund requests!

How to Prevent (2 of 2)

- **DMARC record** on your company domain name – spoofed emails will not get delivered
- **Training!!!**
 - Provide examples of **BEC**
 - Show how **easy** it is to spoof emails
 - Training should be tailored to **specific teams** – they may see different threats
 - Security is **everyone's** responsibility!

Cyber Insurance

- Prepare for the worst!
- Cyber risk insurance or **Cyber Liability Insurance Coverage (CLIC)**
- **Transfer** risk to someone else!
- By 2020, premiums at **\$7.5 billion**
- **1/3 companies** have some type of cyber insurance
- Covers first **AND** third parties



Comments / Questions?!

